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Introduction
This paper examines how family ownership affects the market and accounting performance of public companies. It pays special attention to two features of family ownership: the presence of other blockholders in capital structure and the degree of involvement of family members in the firm. The paper relates to the recent stream of empirical literature on the effects of concentrated ownership on firm performance.
Until recently, the dominant paradigm in academic literature was that most public companies were widely held. The main challenge was to provide remedies to the classical agency problem present in such corporations. Berle and Means (1932) and later Jensen and Meckling (1976) are among the first to state that the separation between ownership and control can cause problems and incur important costs to shareholders. However, a series of recent studies on ownership structure reveals that in most markets a large number of listed companies do not have a widely dispersed ownership structure. They have in general one or more large shareholders that can be categorised as families, states, other industrial or financial companies. Among these types of owners, family firms appear to be the most common form of ownership.
1 This new view on ownership structure calls for a careful analysis of the consequences family ownership has on agency theory and company performance. Early literature on family firms finds that these firms seem to be more profitable and have a higher market valuation than non-family firms. It seems therefore that family ownership might be a way to reduce agency costs existing between managers and shareholders and thus contribute to more value creation. The potential benefits associated to the presence of a majority shareholder are not new. Berle and Means (1932) already considered this possibility. Such a shareholder would have a far bigger incentive to control management since a large part of his wealth is invested in the company. As a result, every shareholder would benefit from this situation. As convincing as the argument seems to be, It is widely accepted that the presence of a large shareholder can diminish or does at least not aggravate the classical conflict between firm owners and managers and thus reduce agency costs (Agency Costs I). However, the potential benefits of having a large shareholder in a company can be limited by the appearance of another type of agency problem. Large shareholders may influence decisions that foster their personal profit or utility but neglect or even harm minority shareholders (Agency Costs II). The extraction of private benefits is in the centre of this problem. Since its modelisation by Grossman and Hart (1980) authors have tried to quantify the magnitude of private benefits. Dyck and Zingales (2004) observe that based on a sample of 39 markets throughout the world private benefits of control amount on average to 14% of equity value.
From a theoretical point of view, it is not clear which of the two effects prevails. An increased monitoring of management that result in a better alignment of interests between owner and manager can only be positive while the extraction of private benefits or entrenchment of a large shareholder can be harmful to minority shareholder. Consequently, it becomes an empirical question which effect is predominant.
This paper addresses this question by analyzing empirically the performance of Swiss family firms. We especially focus on the presence of other blockholders in family firms and the influence they have on firm performance and profitability. This is, to our knowledge, one of the very first studies to look in detail at family firms with multiple blockholders. We also investigate the impact of active management by family members, either by the company founder himself, his family or descendants. The Swiss market is especially suited for analyses of family firms, and large shareholders in general, as it is and has been the most widespread form of ownership in this market.
Using data for companies listed on the Swiss stock exchange between 2003 and 2007 we find support for significantly higher performance of family firms as opposed to non-family firms in terms of both market and accounting performance. Profitability is highest for families being majority shareholders whereas market value is also higher for families detaining 20 to 50% of their company. Family firms are not only better performers than non-family firms in general but also compare favourably to firms with different ownership structures. Further analysis shows that not every family firm creates equal value. Only family firms in which a family member is actively involved in day to day management as CEO or Chairman create value. Especially founders acting as Chairman and descendants being CEO enhance corporate value and profitability. Finally, the presence of a second shareholder possessing a stake between 5 and 10% of voting rights in a family company significantly increases market valuation and profitability due to a more limited extraction of private benefits of control.
These findings are generally robust to different econometric techniques and specifications including pooled (average) regressions, instrumental variable 2SLS regressions for endogeneity, the use of a balanced panel, return on equity as alternative accounting measure and winsorising or dropping outliers.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. In section 3 data and variables are presented and defined. Section 4 shows the main results while further robustness tests and specifications are analysed in section 5. Section 6 contains our conclusions.
Literature
Studies on ownership structure and on agency theory in the presence of large shareholders mentioned in the previous section have led to several empirical studies on the performance of family firms.
First studies on the topic were published for the US and Canadian markets. Both McConaughy et al. (1998) for Canada and Anderson and Reeb (2003) for the S&P 500 in the United States find that family firms outperform their non-family counterparts. For the United
States market especially family firms with a founding-family member CEO are more profitable.
Descendants as CEO, however, do not seem to affect performance positively or negatively. From those first studies, it seems that active management by the family and especially by the founder appear to be important for the firm to create value and to be more profitable. These initial results were thereupon extended to different markets and analysed in more refined ways.
Villalonga and Amit (2006) in a study of Fortune 500 companies push the analysis further than Anderson and Reeb and find different results. They suggest a focus on characteristics of family firms in the analysis of their performance. According to their results, firms in which the founder is active as CEO or Chairman perform much better than those managed by descendants. A differentiation between ownership and control through control-enhancing mechanisms such as cross-holdings, pyramidal structures or dual-class shares also negatively affect firm performance in many cases. Contrary to Anderson and Reeb it shows that it is wrong to assume that family firms per se outperform non-family firms. Depending on the characteristics of the firm the result may differ significantly. Pérez-González (2006) looks in more detail at CEO succession in family firms. His findings show evidence that inherited control has a negative impact on both firm valuation and profitability which can be interpreted as a sign of nepotism if founders put their heirs in charge of the firm instead of an outside CEO. This is especially the case for firms in which the descendant did not attend a selective college.
As far as Western Europe is concerned, two cross-country studies by Barontini and Caprio (2006) 
Data Description

Data
The analysed dataset covers all companies listed on the Swiss Stock Exchange (SIX) for the period 2003 to 2007. In a first step the sample is reduced to companies included in the Swiss Performance Index (SPI) which ensures that firms with a low free-float or that can be assimilated to investment companies are excluded of the analysis. In a second step all financials (ICB 8000) and utilities (ICB 7000) are discarded. A stronger regulation of financial companies and a heavy influence by the government on utility companies complicates the calculation of comparable and 2 Literature on multiple blockholders in general is vast and discusses in depth whether the presence of more than one large shareholder can be positive or negative. Bloch and Hege (2001) develop a model where blockholders compete for control and thus do not create value while Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) and Zwiebel (1995) show how blockholders can form coalitions in a firm to extract benefits. On the other side Bolton and von Thadden (1998), Winton (1993) and Lehmann and Weigand (2000) show the positive effects of multiple blockholders. 
Ownership Variables
The main ownership criterion in our case is represented by the holding of a shareholder of ultimate voting rights in a company. These may diverge considerably from ultimate cash-flow rights for companies with control-enhancing mechanisms which are not uncommon in the Swiss market. Ownership data is hand-collected from the disclosure of shareholdings register of the Swiss Exchange, the Swiss Stock Guide and the firms' annual reports for the respective years.
Where these sources did not suffice to exactly determine the ultimate shareholder newspapers, magazines and websites were used to complete the data. For these non-official sources information had to emanate from at least two different sources to ensure the correctness.
The collected ownership data is subdivided into different categories with the family group being the most important one in this analysis. A company with no shareholder owning more than 20% of voting rights is considered widely held. Any firm with a shareholder holding more than 20% faces the presence of a blockholder which can take different forms. 3 Though not in full control, this 20% threshold normally allows a shareholder to have a significant influence on the firm in the wake of low shareholder participation at Annual General Meetings.
A blockholder can take five different forms. The category of interest in this paper concerns families or individuals. 4 To be considered a family firm an individual or a family must be the largest shareholder and hold at least 20% of ultimate voting rights. Individuals must be part of the founding family or where this is not the case must have been an investor over a long period of time and have shaped the company in a substantial way. For example, the Hayek family controls the Swatch Group, a major watch maker. It has held approximately 40% of the shares for most of the last 20 years, both Mr. Hayek senior and junior as well as other family members are active in the firm and they have shaped the company to make it what it is today. Although not the founder family Swatch can be considered a family firm. This restriction ensures that firms with individuals that are pure financial investors are not mistaken for family firms. Additional information related to family control is also collected from the sources mentioned above. Data on CEO, Chairman, and board member identity or any combination thereof by the controlling family is collected as evidence of an active role as opposed to a simple passive ownership.
Another type of blockholders may be a government as a controlling shareholder. Government in this context means a governmental entity which, in Switzerland, can be federal, cantonal (regional) or municipal. Other blockholders may include any company, financial or industrial, but which in both cases is itself widely-held. Finally, a miscellaneous category pools all firms with blockholders that do not fit into any other category. The majority consists of cooperatives that hold the shares of the listed company.
Control and Performance Variables
Market and accounting performance is measured as Tobin's Q and Return on Assets (ROA)
respectively. Tobin's Q is defined as (market value of common equity + book value of total assets -book value of common equity) divided by book value of total assets. In case of companies with multiple listed share classes the value of every single share class is added. The following variables used to control for industry-and firm-specific characteristics, that are standard in the literature, are used for each year. Firm size is measured as the logarithm of total assets, age is defined as logarithm of years since firm foundation, industry is defined according to the ICB classification, leverage is measured as total book value of debt/common shareholder's equity, investment intensity is capex/PPE, growth opportunities are represented by the increase in one-year sales and return volatility is the standard deviation of monthly returns of the preceding 60 months. All data was obtained from Datastream. Missing data in Datastream was complemented by data from the respective annual reports.
Descriptive statistics
Following the definitions above family firms represent on average 52% of companies in the sample over the period 2003 to 2007. 35% are widely held companies, while 5% respectively 2% are owned by other widely held industrial and financial companies, 4% are state owned and 2%
are categorised as miscellaneous. 5 These numbers remain very stable over the period examined with only very few companies changing categories. Telecommunications industry.
[Insert Table 1 about here] of the firms in the sample are family firms, 35% widely held companies while the rest has a large shareholder other than a family. 31% of these family firms have a CEO member of the family, while 50% have a family Chairman. In 17% of family firms a family member holds both the position of CEO and Chairman. 39% of family firms resort to a capital structure composed of more than one share-class that can either be listed or unlisted.
[Insert Table 2 about here] Table 3 shows results of the univariate analysis of the sample by testing difference of means between family and non-family firms.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Family firms have significantly higher return on assets both with EBIT and EBITDA as numerator whereas Tobin's Q is higher but not significantly. Multiple share classes, as control enhancing means for large shareholders, are used in 38% of family firms whereas only 6% of non-family firms do. It suggests that family firms try to preserve the control in their companies.
As Kunz (2002) outlines, the number of companies with dual-class shares has dramatically decreased in the last 20 years in Switzerland which shows that families and companies are now more inclined to follow the one share one vote principle. Moreover, family firms have significantly lower investment propensity and take on less debt which is in line with US evidence by Anderson and Reeb (2003) or Villalonga and Amit (2006) . In contrast to these studies we have observed that family firms have significantly less volatile share prices. This finding supports the notion that family firms have a long term outlook which allows them to be more stable than companies pursuing short term goals. Non-family firms are smaller in size but still of considerable size with an average of 2.5 billion CHF in total assets. Both types of firms can be considered established companies with an average of 71 and 64 years for family and non-family firms respectively.
Regression Results
A two-way fixed effect model with dummies for each year and industry under consideration is used to asses the relation between firm performance (Tobin's Q, ROA) on the one side and family control on the other side. The basic form of the regression takes the shape evidence of a strong outperformance of family as compared to non-family firms. Tobin's Q is also significantly higher for family firms. All three measures are significant at the 0.05-level.
Columns 2, 4 and 6 show evidence that the ROA of family firms in which the family holds at least 50% of outstanding shares, and can thus be considered a majority shareholder, perform better than those in which the family has a stake between 20 and 50%. However, Tobin's Q is lower on average for firms with a family as majority shareholder. This result indicates that companies in which the family has total control work more profitably but that on the contrary the market favours family firms in which the family does not have a majority of the votes.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The previous analysis suggests that family firms perform better than non-family firms. it remains to be seen if family firms perform better than all other firms irrespective of their ownership structure or if widely-held firms are poor performers and other kinds of blockholders also perform better. To study this question we break down the data of non-family firms into different categories of widely-held, owned by a governmental entity, a widely-held corporation or financial firm or miscellaneous. For family firms, a threshold of 20% is used. Results in table 5 suggest that the ownership type has a different influence on firm performance. The market seems to value family firms highest while all results on other types of blockholders seem to have different impacts but not in a significant way. The accounting performance measure yields different results. ROA with the EBIT as numerator shows that although family firms still seem to be the best performers no blockholder type can differentiate itself from the performance of widely-held companies. Considering ROA with EBITDA as numerator state controlled firms seem to perform best at a 0.1-level while family firms also have a positive impact but not at a significant level. The positive results for state-controlled companies show that these companies could be more efficient than commonly thought or it is just a result of a possible bias due to the very small sample of government-controlled firms in the study. 7 It may also be possible that depreciation and amortization takes a different form in state-controlled companies and thus changes results as only return on assets with EBITDA as numerator yields the above mentioned finding.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
These results stand in some contrast to those found by Andres (2008) on the German market.
He finds evidence that family firms significantly outperform widely-held companies considering both market and accounting performance measures. Other blockholder types underperform with regard to accounting performance but not market valuation. An interesting result in Table 4 and 5 is the coefficient obtained for the dummy variable indicating the presence of a dual-class capital structure. This coefficient is systematically negative and almost always significant with a magnitude equal to that of the family firm dummy variable. This indicates that family firms with dual-class shares do not outperform other firms which indicates the likely presence of agency problems at these firms.
Family firm performance and active management
Earlier results on family firm performance show that it would be wrong to judge family firms as such without further differentiation. Evidence was found that performance might depend on a variety of other characteristics and here especially on the involvement of family members in the company. Studies on the generation and position a family member takes in the company have yielded different results. Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that family firms with founder-CEO perform better whereas those with descendant-CEO significantly underperform compared to widely-held companies. Barontini and Caprio (2006) Table 6 shows results for family firms in which either the founder or descendants take an active position in the company as CEO or Chairman or only a passive approach by solely holding shares. The case in which no family member is active in the company yields the worst results. It seems that mere share holding is no sufficient reason to explain the performance of family firms.
The family must actively participate in the management of the company. The market favours active founders more than descendants but both significantly outperform widely-held companies.
Concerning accounting performance firms with active descendants are significantly more profitable than widely-held companies. Active founders only yield significantly higher profitability for the case with EBITDA as numerator. It seems that the knowledge of the family in running the company is important. Family members have superior skills and incentives that enhance the value of a firm above the gains that result from a reduction of agency costs from holding shares in their company.
[Insert Table 6 about here] Table 7 reports more detailed results by not only looking at the above-shown generational distinction but also on the distinction between CEO and Chairman. Evidence suggests that outside CEO work less profitably, be it in comparison to family members or widely-held companies. Descendant CEO, however, show a significantly better market and accounting performance whereas firms with founder CEO do not perform significantly better than widelyheld companies.
Analysis of the Chairman position shows evidence that once again outsiders do not perform better than widely-held companies. The market seems to value both founder and descendants as
Chairman with a better performance for firms with founder Chairmen. Profitability equally augments with a family member active as Chairman but in this case descendants do better.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Family firms with multiple blockholders
It has been established in the previous analyses that family firms outperform non-family firms in most cases depending on different characteristics of the firms that were studied. The results therefore suggest that families indeed add value to companies by reducing agency costs of type I.
From the previous results it is, however, not possible to determine if agency costs of type II between the family, as large shareholder, and minority shareholders exist or not. It is possible that they exist but are more than offset by the reduction of the classical agency problems. One way of reducing uncertainty concerning agency costs of type II consists of looking at the other shareholders in a firm. It can be argued that a large shareholder can extract private benefits from his company if he has enough power in it. This would be equivalent to a rise in agency costs II as the problem shifts to conflicts between large shareholder who work in their interest and minority shareholder who cannot defend themselves easily. An effective way of reducing this problem would be for a company to have a second large shareholder to counterbalance some of the power of the family shareholder and challenge the extraction of private benefits. Too small, the stake will not suffice to counterbalance the family blockholder, too big and power struggles can break out and paralyse the good functioning of the company. This is supported by findings that family firms with no or very small second blockholders owning less than 5% in the company do not perform better than non-family firms. It is equally true for family firms with a second blockholder controlling more than 30% of voting rights. The results show that a second blockholder controlling 5-10% of the firm's voting rights is optimal. This level allows for a good control of the controlling family shareholder without giving the controller too much power to block every decision. Both market and accounting performance measures are significantly higher than for non-family firms.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
We further investigate this issue by analyzing the difference between the stakes of the first and second blockholder. In unreported results we find that the impact on performance is positive and significant for a difference of maximal 20% between the stakes. This confirms the idea that a second blockholder is better able to control the majority shareholder when both have approximately equally-sized shareholdings. When the difference is too large (more than 20%)
there is no beneficial effect on performance. We further examine if the identity of the second blockholder has an influence on firm performance. In unreported results, we find evidence that when it is an individual it improves performance but not when it is another corporation or the state. This would indicate that a second blockholder controls efficiently the majority shareholder when its personal wealth is involved and not when there is some dispersed ownership.
Robustness Tests
Endogeneity poses one of the potentially biggest problems when looking at family firm performance. One can argue that it is not the ownership structure that yields a better performance of family firms but that on the contrary good performance influences the decision if a company is family-controlled or not. The possibility exists that a family will only stay on as a shareholder or pass on the company if it performs well but sell it if it does not perform adequately.
During the sample period only six companies changed their ownership structure from family firm to non-family firm. In four cases the family owner lowered his stake under the 20% threshold to about 14-16% and kept an active position as CEO, Chairman or even both. In one case the company was bought by a private equity company and in another one the family decided to give up its stake to avoid a control fight with another investor that was trying to take over the company. Thus it cannot be argued that families departed due to poor performance of the company. It is equally significant that family firms have an average age of 71 years and are older than non-family firms. It thus is difficult to believe that families sell their shares in times of poor firm performance or inversely are able to predict the future in a correct way over such a long period of time. Finally, no other study on family firm performance has found any trace of endogeneity thus far.
To confirm these intuitive reasons we test the endogeneity issue by using an instrumental variable 2SLS regression. We use lagged family ownership variables as instruments for the analysis. Results in table 9 show that after controlling for endogeneity family firms still yield a higher profitability and market value than non-family firms.
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[Insert Table 9 about here]
The analysis of family firm performance should effectively reflect the link between the specification and attributes. To verify the robustness of the results obtained in the previous chapter several tests are performed.
The presence of outliers can drive results in the analysis due to the relative smallness of the Swiss market. Several sensitivity tests were conducted as capping and winsorising data at the one, two-and-a-half and five percent level and yielded similar results. Another potential bias can arise from companies that drop out during the sample period. Therefore, we use a balanced sample that comprises 641 firm-year observations or 128 firms.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
Results shown in table 10 reflect a slightly lower but still significant outperformance in both market valuation and profitability of family firms. Considering second blockholders Tobin's Q improves while ROA both EBIT (not shown in the table) and EBITDA as numerator decreases but also stays significantly positive relative to non-family firms. Table 11 shows a further robustness test in which the accuracy of the accounting performance measured by return on asset is tested by using the return on equity (ROE) as performance variable.
[Insert Table 11 about here]
Findings confirm that family firms are more profitable than non-family firms. At the same time family firms outperform companies with other types of blockholders and still perform best if a second blockholder detains 5-10% of share capital.
In a further robustness test on econometric modelling we use pooled (average) regressions instead of fixed effects regressions. Data in table 12 supports the findings that family firms create more value and are more profitable than their non-family counterparts and that a second blockholder in the company is still beneficial in both cases.
[Insert There is a possibility that the reduction in agency costs is bigger than costs related to the extraction of private benefits and therefore makes them invisible. The presence of a second large shareholder can alleviate this problem by controlling more closely the largest shareholder. We look at this question as well as at different other family firm characteristics.
The Swiss market provides an ideal setting to take a closer look at the conflicting effects of the presence of family firms on firm value. This market is a classic continental European market with long-established companies which have a family as blockholder in 52% of the cases. Using panel data on 178 firms for the period 2003-2007 we find that family firms create more value and are more profitable than non-family firms. These results also hold for family firms compared to companies that are not widely held but that have a blockholder that is not a family. It is equally important that a family member is active in the company as either CEO, Chairman or both. It seems that the family factor is crucial and that family members have some superior knowledge on how to run their company. However, this value-creating knowledge is not confined to the founder but also exists in heir-managed family firms. We also document that the outperformance of family firms disappears when the firms have a capital structure with dual class shares indicating the likely presence of agency problems. Finally, we provide evidence that a second blockholder who owns between 5 and 10% of voting rights is even more beneficial to family firms performance. It indicates that market participants value the control of family members by a third party.
It would be interesting to examine the second blockholder and his implication more closely in a separate study. It is possible that equally to the fact that families perform better than other blockholders, the second large shareholder identity can have an influence on the results. It seems possible that in certain cases a second blockholder could ally with the largest shareholder and have an even more disastrous effect for minority shareholders. Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the sample. The variables for the analysed sample of 178 firms and 772 firm-year observations includes Tobin's Q, return on assets, one-year sales growth, capital expenditure/PPE, total debt/total equity, return volatility, firm size and age. Family Firm denotes a dummy taking the value 1 if the firm has a family or individual with 20% or more voting rights. Family CEO, Family Chairman, Family CEO-Chairman Dualty indicates a dummy equalling 1 if a family member is CEO, Chairman, CEO and Chairman respectively in a family firm. Dual-Class shares designates a dummy with the value 1 if a company has more than one share class. Widely-held denotes firms in which no shareholder has at least 20% of voting rights.
Mean
Median Table 3 Tests of difference of means between family and non-family firms. The variables for the analysed sample of 178 firms and 772 firm-year observations include Tobin's Q, return on assets, one-year sales growth, capital/expenditure/PPE, total debt/shareholder's equity, return volatility, firm size and age. Family CEO, Family Chairman, Family CEO-Chairman Dualty indicates a dummy equalling 1 if a family member is CEO, Chairman, CEO and Chairman respectively in a family firm. Dual-Class shares designates a dummy with the value 1 if a company has more than one share class. ***, **, * shows significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively.
Family Firms
Non Table 4 Firm performance and family ownership The variables for the analysed sample of 178 firms and 772 firm-year observations include Tobin's Q, return on assets with EBIT and EBITDA as numerator, one-year sales growth, capital expenditure/PPE, total debt/shareholder's equity, return volatility, firm size and age. Family firm, family owning 20-50%, family owning 50% or more indicate a dummy equalling 1 if the company is respectively a family firm, has a family owning 20-50% or more than 50% of the stocks. Dual-Class shares designates a dummy with the value 1 if a company has more than one share class. ***, **, * shows significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Table 6 Family firm performance and active management of family members The variables for the analysed sample of 178 firms and 772 firm-year observations include Tobin's Q, return on assets with EBIT and EBITDA as numerator, one-year sales growth, capital expenditure/PPE, total debt/shareholder's equity, return volatility, firm size and age. Founder active and descendant active indicate a dummy equalling 1 if the founder or a descendant is actively managing the company as CEO or Chairman. Passive owner indicates that the family only holds shares in the company without taking an active position in it. Dual-Class shares designates a dummy with the value 1 if a company has more than one share class. ***, **, * shows significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Table 7 Family firm performance and active management The variables for the analysed sample of 178 firms and 772 firm-year observations include Tobin's Q, return on assets with EBIT and EBITDA as numerator, one-year sales growth, capital expenditure/PPE, total debt/shareholder's equity, return volatility, firm size and age. Founder CEO, descendant CEO and Outsider CEO indicate a dummy equalling 1 if respectively the founder, a descendant or an outsider holds the CEO position in the family firm. The same is applied for founder, descendant and outsider Chairman. Dual-Class shares designates a dummy with the value 1 if a company has more than one share class. ***, **, * shows significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. (EBIT) . The analysed sample consists of 619 firm-year observations. Family firm, family owning 20-50%, family owning 50% or more indicate a dummy equalling 1 if the company is respectively a family firm, has a family owning 20-50% or more than 50% of the stocks. Founder CEO, descendant CEO and Outsider CEO indicate a dummy equalling 1 if respectively the founder, a descendant or an outsider holds the CEO position in the family firm. The same is applied for founder, descendant and outsider Chairman. All usual control variables, dummies for industries and years and robust standard errors are used in the regression. ***, **, * shows significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Table 10 Family firm performance in a balanced sample of 128 companies The variables for the analysis of balanced panel data of 128 firms and 640 firm-year observations include Tobin's Q, return on assets with EBIT and EBITDA as numerator, one-year sales growth, capital expenditure/PPE, total debt/shareholder's equity, return volatility, firm size and age. The different second blockholder variables indicate a dummy equalling 1 if a second large blockholder exists in a family firm and controls voting rights in one of the given intervals. Dual-Class shares designates a dummy with the value 1 if a company has more than one share class. ***, **, * shows significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Table 11 Family firm performance The variables for the analysed sample of 178 firms and 772 firm-year observations include return on equity, one-year sales growth, capital expenditure/PPE, total debt/shareholder's equity, return volatility, firm size and age. The different second blockholder variables indicate a dummy equalling 1 if a second large blockholder exists in a family firm and controls voting rights in one of the given intervals. Family firm, state, widely held corporation, widely held financial and miscellaneous indicate a dummy equalling 1 if the largest ultimate shareholder owns more than 20% of the shares in one of the categories. Dual-Class shares designates a dummy with the value 1 if a company has more than one share class. ***, **, * shows significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. Table 12 Pooled (average) regression on family firm performance The variables for the pooled regression analysis of unbalanced panel data of 178 firms and 772 firm-year observations include Tobin's Q, return on assets with EBIT and EBITDA as numerator, one-year sales growth, capital expenditure/PPE, total debt/shareholder's equity, return volatility, firm size and age. The different second blockholder variables indicate a dummy equalling 1 if a second large blockholder exists in a family firm and controls voting rights in one of the given intervals. Dual-Class shares designates a dummy with the value 1 if a company has more than one share class. ***, **, * shows significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
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